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down in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,20 and to take into consideration the
nationalities of the parties, the law to be applied, the fact that the bills of
lading were written in English, and the availability and location of possi-
ble witnesses.
The Elikon decision is significant because it provides new authority
for the Indussa approach to the disputed issue of forum selection clauses.
Although this approach is an exception to the general rule of upholding
the validity of forum selection clauses, it is consistent with the provisions
of Restatement (Second) of the Conflict of Laws21 and the Model Choice
of Forum Act.22 Both the Restatement and the Model Choice of Forum
Act allow the courts to declare forum selection clauses invalid when there
is a violation of public policy, or when the transaction is otherwise unfair,
unjust, or unreasonable. 2 While Bremen recognized this exception, In-
dussa and Elikon have gone further by directly applying the exception to
bills of lading governed by COGSA and invalidating forum selection
clauses which relieve or lessen the liability of ocean carriers.
Wade H. Gateley
Eain v. Wilkes: Establishing the Parameters
of the Political Offense Exception in
Extradition Treaties
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently upheld the
extradition of a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
accused by Israel of exploding a bomb that killed and injured over thirty
people.1 After fleeing to this country, the PLO member had sought a writ
of habeas corpus to prevent the Secretary of State from extraditing him
to Israel. The court, in a strongly worded opinion, rejected the peti-
tioner's argument that the bombing constituted a political offense-a de-
termination which would have blocked his extradition to Israel. Eain v.
Wilkes is noteworthy for several reasons. First, the court reiterated the
traditionally important role the judiciary plays in extradition proceed-
20. 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT oF LAWS § 80 (1971).
22. MODEL CHOICE OF FOEUM ACT (National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, 1968).
23. See Nanda, Forum Selection and Choice-of-Law Agreements in International Con-
tracts, THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BusiNEss TRANSACTIONS § 8 (V. Nanda ed. 1981).
1. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
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ings, particularly with regard to the "political offense" exception found in
many extradition treaties. Second, the court indicated that those crimes
which fit within the political offense exception must be aimed at the po-
litical, and not the social, structure of a country. Third, the court empha-
sized that the United States would not be a safe haven for terrorists who
come to this country to avoid answering for their crimes.
On May 11, 1979, Abu Eain, a member of the PLO, travelled to the
restort town of Tiberias, Israel, to find a place to hide a bomb. Three
days later, on the celebration of Israel's independence day, he returned to
Tiberias and placed a bomb in a refuse bin in the center of town. The
subsequent explosion killed two boys and injured thirty other persons.
Eain then obtained a visa to enter the United States and arrived in Chi-
cago, where on August 22, 1979, he was arrested by the F.B.I. on the basis
of information supplied by Israeli authorities. Shortly thereafter, Israel
sought his extradition under the terms of its 1962 Extradition Convention
with the United States.'
After a hearing, a magistrate found that Eain should be extradited to
Israel to stand trial for murder, attempted murder, and causing bodily
harm with aggravating intent.8 Eain sought a writ of habeas corpus from
2. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707,
T.I.A.S. No. 5476, 484 U.N.T.S. 283 (entered into force Dec. 5, 1963) [hereinafter cited as
the Extradition Convention].
3. In Re Abu Eain, No. 79 M 175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1979). The Extradition Convention
specifies that:
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present Con-
vention for prosecution when they have been charged with, or to undergo sen-
tence when they have been convicted of, any of the following offenses:
1. Murder.
2. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm.
Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit or conspiracy to
commit any of the offenses mentioned in this Article provided such attempts
or such conspiracy are punishable under the laws of both Parties by a term of
imprisonment exceeding three years.
Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. II.
The procedure in this country for extradition is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3181-95 (1976).
The statutes require that a country seeking extradition submit a request through proper
diplomatic channels. That request must be supported by sufficient evidence to show that
the individual is the person sought for the crimes charged, that the crimes are among those
listed as extraditable offenses in the treaty, and that there is sufficient justification for the
individual's arrest if the charged crime had been committed in the United States. After
evaluation and approval by the Department of State, the necessary papers may be for-
warded to the U.S. Attorney in the district where the person sought to be extradited may be
found. The U.S. Attorney may then file a complaint and seek an arrest warrant from a
magistrate. If a warrant issues, the magistrate then conducts a hearing under 18 U.S.C. §
3184 to determine "[iff, on such hearing, [the magistrate] deems the evidence sufficient to
sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention. .. ." It is fun-
damental that the person whose extradition is sought is not entitled to a full hearing. The
person charged is not to be tried in this country for crimes he is alleged to have committed
1981
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an Illinois federal district court to prevent the Secretary of State from
extraditing him in accordance with the magistrate's determination, but
the court denied his writ.'
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit," Eain argued that the evidence
against him failed to establish probable cause to believe that he commit-
ted the crimes Israel charged. The court of appeals rejected this argu-
ment s on the technical basis of its limited scope of review on this issue.'
The court then proceeded to examine Eain's alternative argument that
his extradition should be blocked, since his crime constituted a political
offense.8
Under article VI of the United States-Israel Extradition Convention,
extradition shall not be granted "[w]hen the offense is regarded by the
requested Party as one of a political character or if the person sought
proves that the request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a
view to trying or punishing him for an offense of a political character."'
Prior to reaching the merits of Eain's arguments, the court reviewed
the government's suggestions that the role of the judiciary in applying the
political offense exception should be limited one. The government argued
that the determination of the political nature of a crime is itself a politi-
cal question which should be resolved by the legislative and execu-
tive-the political-branches of government.10 Judge Wood, writing for
in the requesting country. That is the task of the civil courts of the other country.
Under section 3184, should the magistrate either determine that the offense charged is
not within a treaty's terms or find an absence of probable cause, the magistrate cannot
certify the matter to the Secretary of State for extradition. If the case is certified to the
Secretary for completion of the extradition process it is in the Secretary's sole discretion to
determine whether or not extradition should proceed further with the issuance of a warrant
of surrender. See 4 G. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTMRNATIONAL LAW, 49-50 (1942); Note, Ex-
ecutive Discretion in Extradition, 62 COLUM. L. RaV. 1313, 1323 (1962).
4. As mentioned in 641 F.2d at 507.
5. There is no statutory provision for direct appeal of an adverse ruling by a person
whose extradition is sought. Instead, that person must seek a writ of habeas corpus. Collins
v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364 (1920).
6. 641 F.2d at 509-12.
7. The scope of habeas corpus review in extradition cases is a limited one, according
due deference to the magistrate's initial determination. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311,
312 (1925). "[H]abeas corpus is available only to inquire whether the magistrate had juris-
diction, whether the offense charged is within the treaty and, by a somewhat liberal exten-
sion, whether there is any evidence warranting the finding that there was reasonable ground
to believe the accused guilty." Id. at 312.
8. Eain also argued that Israel's "indictment" of him for the alleged crimes amounted
only to a subterfuge in order to have him returned for trial, not for the alleged offenses, but
instead for the political offense of membership in the Al Fatah branch of the PLO. The
court of appeals held that the determination whether the request for extradition amounted
to subterfuge by Israel is a decision clearly within the sole province of the Secretary of
State. 641 F.2d at 518. See also Laubenheimer v. Factor, 61 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1932); In re
Lincoln, 288 F. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1915), afl'd per curiam, 241 U.S. 651 (1916); Sindona v. Grant,
461 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
9. Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. VI, para. 4.
10. 641 F. 2d at 513-17.
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the court, noted that there was no case precedent for the proposition that
only the political branches should decide whether a crime is a political
offense."1 Rather, it is the judicial branch which usually determines
whether the political offense exception applies. 2 The court found support
for this view in the extradition statutes which require a hearing to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient evidence "to sustain the charge under the
provisions of the proper treaty."' s
While the court concurred in the government's analysis that, in gen-
eral, the Constitution places foreign policy and international affairs in the
hands of the executive,1 4 it rejected the government's conclusion that the
political nature of these areas renders them unsuitable for judicial consid-
eration." As the court pointed out, "it is error to suppose that every case
or controversy which touches foreign relations relies upon judicial compe-
tence."'" The court went on to recognize the need for "special sensitivity"
in the area of foreign affairs,' 7 but declared that "[t]his sensitivity does
not preclude the Judiciary from having a part of the process of determin-
ing whether the political offense exception applies. That determination
involves an approach to factfinding that is traditional to the courts."'"
The court refused to accept the government's argument that the ex-
tradition treaty with Israel, by its own terms, left the determination of
whether a crime was a political offense to the executive branch."9 Article
VI, paragraph 4 of the Extradition Convention-"extradition shall not be
granted... when the offense is regarded by the requested party as one
of a political character" 2 0-suggested that such an interpretation was
plausible. On the other hand, such an interpretation would destroy the
procedural safeguards established to protect defendant's rights in extradi-
tion proceedings."'
Having established the role of the judiciary in applying the political
offense exception, the court of appeals moved to the merits of Eain's ar-
guments. The petitioner pointed out the distinction between "pure" and
"relative" political offenses 2 and contended that the Tiberias bombing
11. Id. at 513.
12. Id. Sayne v. Shipley, 418 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1969), is the only case where the execu-
tive was permitted to make the initial determination in extradition matters that the crime
charged was committed and that the person sought to be extradited commited it. However,
Sayne is unique because it involved a treaty that implicated the special relationship be-
tween the Canal Zone and the Republic of Panama. Id. at 686. The Sayne court went on to
indicate that executive determination to extradite is still subject to review on habeas corpus.
13. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (1976) (emphasis added).
14. 641 F.2d at 514.
15. Id.
16. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962), qucted in 641 F.2d at 514.
17. Id. at 515.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 517-18.
20. Extradition Convention, supra note 2, art. VI para. 4 (emphasis added).
21. 641 F.2d at 518.
22. Id. at 512.
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was a "relative" offense. Since the political aspects of his crime were so
interwoven with the bombing itself, the entire offense should be regarded
as political. In rejecting this argument, the court held that the definition
of political offenses in extradition treaties "limits such offenses to acts
committed in the course of and incidental to a violent political distur-
bance such as a war, revolution or rebellion."2 s
In order to interpret this definition, the court focused on those cases
which had prevented extradition on the grounds of a political offense and
distinguished the "ongoing organized battles between contending armies"
in those cases2 4 and the "dispersed nature" of the PLO.25 Therefore, de-
spite Eain's membership in the PLO, his crimes were not political of-
fenses given the nature of the conflict between Israel and the PLO.
More significantly, the court noted that the definition of "political
disturbance" was aimed at acts that disrupt the political rather than the
social structure of a state.2 6 In the Seventh Circuit's view, terrorist activ-
ity seeks to promote social chaos by attacking the social structure and
does not fit within the political offense exception:
The exception does not make a random bombing intended to result in
the cold-blooded murder of civilians incidental to a purpose of top-
pling a government, absent a direct link between the perpetrator, a
political organization's political goals, and the specific act. Rather, the
indiscriminate bombing of a civilian populace is not recognised as a
protected political act even when the larger "political" objective of
the person who sets off the bomb may be to eliminate the civilian
population of a country. Otherwise, isolated acts of social violence un-
dertaken for personal reasons would be protected simply because they
occurred during a time of political upheaval, a result we think the
political offense exception was not meant to produce.' 7
Several aspects of the case deserve brief mention. First, the court's
rejection of the government's argument that the executive should decide
whether the political offense exception applies seems warranted for politi-
cal reasons. With the frequently sensitive nature of foreign affairs, a de-
termination by the executive concerning the application of the political
offense exception might be based on facts wholly irrelevant to a proper
determination. For example, the executive might be influenced in its deci-
sion by the quality of the relationship shared with the country requesting
extradition, granting the exception more frequently when the requesting
country was not a close ally. In theory, the judiciary would not be subject
23. Id. at 518.
24. Id. at 519. Ramos v. Diaz, 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959) (members of organized
revolutionary army with established chain of command operating within the country);
United Staes v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 393 (S.D. Cal. 1959) (military government installed
by Nazis during World War II; discussed in dicta).
25. 641 F.2d at 519.
26. Id. at 520-21.
27. Id. at 521.
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to such influences and could assure the high degree of objectivity required
to guarantee the rights of persons in extradition proceedings. In a similar
vein, the court of appeals noted that the United States' present system of
extradition provides the executive flexibility by allowing it to defer to the
judiciary's decision. 8 This, in turn, "permits the executive branch to re-
move itself from political and economic sanctions which might result if
other nations believe the United States lax in the enforcement of its
treaty obligations."2
One troublesome aspect of Eain v. Wilkes involves the court's defini-
tion of political offenses and its distinction between the "ongoing organ-
ized battles between contending armies" in cases which upheld political
offense exceptions and the "dispersed nature" of the PLO-Israeli conflict
in Wilkes.80 In effect, the court suggests that the political offense excep-
tion will be applied more readily, if not exclusively, in the more tradi-
tional warfare situations. However the court's distinction ignores the real-
ity of modern warfare, where revolutions and rebellions are less often
conducted in an organized fashion. If the court's analysis were to be rig-
idly followed, then few people would ever qualify under the exception,
since so few people could ever claim to have fought in organized battles.
In any event, it is difficult to understand how a particular type of warfare,
by itself, could form the basis for a decision to grant or deny a political
offense exception.
The court's analysis is also questionable when it distinguishes of-
fenses aimed at the political structure of a government and offenses
aimed at the social structure that established that government.8 ' In a
footnote, the court acknowledges "that it may not be 'textbook' political
science and sociology to distinguish between disagreement with a govern-
ment and with the society that establishes it."" Unfortunately, the court
fails to resolve this dilemma, and merely concludes that "we are con-
cerned here only with a violent act focused at the social structure."3
By using this questionable distinction as the major basis for its deci-
sion, Eains v. Wilkes gives rise to speculation concerning the real basis
for its holding. That basis may very well lie in the often brutal history of
the PLO and the court's refusal to legitimize in any way such semingly
senseless acts. In a rather emotional passage, the court reveals its feelings
on this issue, stating that if a mere presentation of evidence that the PLO
seeks the destruction of the Israeli political structure and directs its de-
structive efforts at a defined civilian populace was
all that was necessary in order to prevent extradition under the politi-
28. Id. at 513.
29. Lubet & Czaczkes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Polit-
ical Terrorists, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 193, 200 (1980), quoted in 641 F.2d at 513.
30. Id. at 519.
31. Id. at 520-21.
32. Id. at 521 n.20.
33. Id.
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cal offense exception nothing would prevent an influx of terrorists
seeking a safe haven in America. Those terrorists who flee to this
country would avoid having to answer to anyone anywhere for their
crimes. The law is not so utterly absurd. . . . We do not need them in
our society. We have enough of our own domestic criminal violence
with which to contend without importing and harboring with open
arms the worst that other countries have to export.'
While the court may have correctly upheld Eain's extradition in this
case, the strong emotions which pervade the opinion may also have
spawned an analysis which would deny the political offense exception to
worthy individuals. Rather than the court's analysis, which emphasizes
the type of warfare and the aim of the particular offense, a more flexible
test is required if political offense exceptions are to have any real mean-
ing. Undoubtedly, future cases will arise where the Seventh Circuit's test
will have to be modified or abandoned if justice is to prevail. While the
United States should never become a safe haven for foreign terrorists and
criminals, neither should it slam the door on those individuals who, for
legitimate reasons, seek refuge from political oppression.
Bernie M. Tuggle
34. Id. at 520.
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